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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
WHO CAN BE CONSERVATIVE? 
- Revisiting the Theory of Leisure Class by Thorstein Veblen with the WVS Data 
 
 
By 
 
 
Wooyong Jung 
 
 
 
 Nowadays in democratic countries, it is not difficult to find a particular voting pattern 
in which people who are less educated, older, and receive less income tend to vote 
conservative parties. South Korea is no exception where the political preference among 
different groups defined by income, age, education level has been clearly divided. This study 
tried to find the logic behind the voting pattern in Korea by delving into the formation 
process of political orientation. To this end, it revisited Veblen’s theory, according to which 
only two groups of individuals can keep their conservativeness either willingly or passively: 
one group which has enough wealth to stand against the pressure of change; and the other so 
destitute that cannot even afford to think of the change and adaptation. In order to prove this, 
this study applied the WVS data conducted in Korea since 1990 to the theory using several 
pooled OLS and logit models. As a result, this study showed that the conservativeness 
decreased as the level of income increased; however, the extent to which the conservative 
orientation reduced became smaller. It meant that the upper crust and the bottom of a society 
showed more conservative inclination than other groups of people. Also it was proved that 
the cohort effect clearly exists in the formation of political orientation. That is, individuals are 
largely influenced by their own growth environment when the political orientation was 
established.  
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1. Introduction 
 In many countries where the democratic election system has been once settled down, it 
is not difficult to find a particular voting pattern in which people who are less educated, older, 
and receive less income tend to vote conservative parties. South Korea (hereafter Korea) is no 
exception where the political preference among different groups defined by income, age, 
education level has been clearly divided. The contrast, especially by age group, was most 
noticeable in the last presidential election which was described in the media “a showdown of 
generations (Park, 2012).” As a result of the ferocious race, the conservative candidate, Park 
Geun-hye was elected thanks to the wholehearted support from the over 50s. More than 70 
percent of voters over 50s voted for her, while only less than 40 percent of the remains vote 
in favor of her. Also as the less educated and low incomers showed their higher preference 
towards her, the hackneyed voting pattern clearly appeared once again. 
 Watching the voting pattern, a couple of questions was raised: what makes some people 
conservative and others liberal, and what makes the conversion in one’s political orientation 
from conservative to liberal or vice versa in life? Have age, income and education level had 
meaningful influence on one’s political orientation? If yes, how much has each of them done? 
 On one hand, intuitively thinking, it seemed somehow improbable that the most 
vulnerable group of a society turned their back on liberal parties and instead supported the 
conservative because it would be more likely for social welfare system to be expanded by 
liberal parties than by the other. On the other hand, their voting behavior can be made sense 
of because the group of people, who are older, less educated, and has less income, tend to be 
rather passive about political issues, skeptical of attending political rally, and less interested 
in statecraft. 
 Many scholars have tried to find this logic behind the tendency using various concept 
and theories from several different academic fields. Most of their studies took data from 
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election result or exit poll which seems to be the most distinct and safest way to prove the 
voting pattern. With the data it is possible to prove the cursory phenomenon, but totally 
insufficient to ferret out the fundamental reasons behind the pattern. Especially, 
over-dependence on the election result or exit poll exposes these studies to an adverse trap in 
which the scholars are just busy showing one moment or one time period of election, so 
easily overlook the process of forming one’s political orientation through whole life to fit the 
mold of his or her own time period. 
 In his most famous book, The Theory of the Leisure Class, Thorstein Veblen once cast 
serious doubt on this pattern and provided a very plausible and interesting point of view 
which is similar to the concepts of Social Darwinism to a large extent. According to him, 
being liberal or conservative is one’s adaptation process facing the incessantly changing 
society or institutions; thus, individuals who have more capability to withstand the 
chronological changes and who are less exposed—or less sensitive—to the demands of the 
time are able to keep their conservative inclination (Veblen, 1899; pp.147-160). 
 On the basis of Veblen’s idea and from the Social Darwinism perspective, this study 
tried to find the logic behind the voting pattern, that is, reasons why the older, less educated, 
and less incomers tend to vote for the conservative candidate by delving into one’s formation 
of political orientation. In other words, it investigated who can stay conservative by enduring 
the social change longer against the demands of their own time and being more unconcerned 
about the change, so not feeling the necessity to change themselves as keenly as the others in 
society. Thus, it set up the following hypotheses on the assumption that every individual is 
conservative: 
- H01: Individual who is in the highest income tier can withstand the demand of 
change longer than the middle tier; thus she or he shows relatively conservative 
inclination at any single moment. 
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- H02: Individual who is in the lowest income tier is relatively less sensitive to the 
social issues and mostly unconcerned about the demand of change; thus she or he 
shows relatively conservative inclination at any single moment. 
 Before testing these hypotheses, this study went through relevant literatures first so that 
it could widen the scope of investigation and mine multiple approaches for insight. Most of 
all, by revisiting The Theory of Leisure Class in the very first part of the next section, it tried 
to understand his theory in depth. In the third section, then this study tested the 
abovementioned hypotheses in earnest by applying a real-world dataset to several linear 
models. The methodology used in the section can be split into two parts. In the first part, it 
formulated definition and characteristics of conservative and liberal orientations in order to 
check if the self-positioning well reflects one’s political values; and in the second part, based 
on the results of the first part, it examined the hypotheses by bringing various factors 
affecting one’s political orientation into the models. 
 
2. Formation of Political Orientation 
 Measuring one’s political orientation can have various meaning in that a number of 
social, psychological, cultural factors affect its formulation. For this reason, scholars having 
once studied this topic used a wide variety of methods and approaches which can be chiefly 
divided twofold in terms of where they put their final research destination: exploring one’s 
explicit political orientation or implicit orientation. The studies on explicit orientation has 
frequently used the data from election results or exit poll, and measured ostensible disposition 
on the map of political orientation. On the other hand, the studies on implicit orientation have 
focused on one’s inner formation of political orientation, and put its focus onto factors having 
influence on the process of the formation. These studies exploited the data not only from the 
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election-related but even from various disciplines such as psychology, sociology, biology, 
etc. 
 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
 This study basically focused on the implicit political orientation because the primary 
purpose of this study was to understand an inherent logic behind explicit political behavior, 
and heavily relied on the theory Veblen had once set up. That is, being conservative is an 
immensely human instinct, and whether or not keeping the conservative inclination depends 
on how long she or he is capable of withstanding the incessant demands of the times. Like all 
other species, Veblen saw the life of human being as a process of selective adaptation, in 
other words “a natural selection of the fittest habits of thought” and “a process of enforced 
adaptation of individuals to an environment which has progressively changed with the growth 
of the community and with the changing institutions under which men have lived.” (Veblen, 
1899; p.147)  
 To put it another way, the law of inertia in physics can refer to the social system and 
life style. The social system and life style of individuals which have been once structured 
tend to be sustained unlimitedly. Individuals in this sustained social system are instinctively 
and unconsciously all conservative because the handed-down institutions and habitual social 
customs are, in itself, the source and the result of conservatism. However, the living 
environment is changing continuously, and at some points, it no longer accords with the 
unchanged social system. This discord is becoming the initial impetus of social evolution, 
and it is the very time when the natural selection test for the fittest habits is about to begin 
(Veblen, 1899; pp.149-150). 
 Once the test through which the fittest institutions or customs survive started, 
individuals in the institution are forced to accept the periodic changes and readjust to new 
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environment. During the process, most importantly, there exist gaps among individuals in 
terms of the timing of embracing the change (see Figure 1). For instance, when the social 
attitudes towards slavery started to change and the abolition of it had come to the fore, some 
immediately supported the abolition while others remained as proslavers and retarded the 
progress. We usually say the latter “more conservative” who hung in the longer against the 
abolition. That is to say, the conservative used to keep their conservative inclination by 
holding out against the chronological change of the period as long as they could. Longer they 
can stand against, thicker their conservative tint is. 
 
Figure 1: Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
 If so, the next question is who then will be the group hanging in the longest and what 
allows them to act on human instinct while other groups relinquish pursuing the instinct—or 
comfort—and adapt themselves to a new institution. According to Veblen, the pressure 
forcing individuals to readjust themselves to a new environment takes the form of “the 
pressure of pecuniary exigencies”, and the group of individuals who is able to ignore the 
economic constraints is “wealthy leisure class” (Veblen, 1899; p.153). This presumption is 
6 
 
not novel at all as Veblen stated, but the logic behind is totally different; that is, the wealthy 
group is conservative not because of the vested interests and accumulated property that are 
easily maintained in the old institution they belong to. Because, for everyone, changing life 
style and thoughts is an irksome toil against instinctive comfort, the group of wealthy people 
has no motivation to get into the toilsome process which would be imposed on the life of 
others who are not wealthy enough to avoid the pecuniary exigencies. 
 In addition to the leisure class, most interestingly, there is another group of individuals 
who does not—more precisely and in contrast with the leisure class, cannot—take the change. 
Veblen stated about this group of individuals, “[t]he abjectly poor, and all those persons 
whose energies are entirely absorbed by the struggle for daily sustenance, are conservative 
because they cannot afford the effort of taking thought for the day after tomorrow (Veblen, 
1899; p.159).” Since they can barely afford to think of the future and take a look around 
themselves, the time and resources spent on the change is a mere waste or extravagance. It is 
the safest bet and the most frugal manner for them to follow the existing system just as the 
wealthy class is willing to maintain. That is to say, the conservatives can be divided into two 
types: one is the wealthy class, or voluntary conservatives, and the other the poor class, or 
passive conservatives. The former tends to tie up the latter to conservatism by capturing the 
money stream, reducing the capability to accumulate property and finally withdrawing the 
energy for innovation so as to maintain their vested interests (Veblen, 1899; pp.159-160). 
 This theory of Veblen gave a huge insight to exploring the latent reasons of the voting 
pattern that is the older, less educated, and less incomers tend to support conservative parties, 
and in a broader sense, it provides a plausible, if not perfect, clue about why those individuals 
are conservative. From now on, this study will turn its gaze into one’s voting behavior, 
especially class voting, and try to explain the political behavior of upwardly mobile 
individuals which Veblen didn’t quite deal with.   
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2.2 Literature Review (LR): Voting Behavior 
 Studying voting behavior has been the most basic method used to measure explicit 
political orientation. In accordance with the rise of political sociology since the early 1930s 
when all political and social upheavals had been heightening, studies on voting behavior was 
considered as an “index of regional differences in social structure” (Bendix and Lipset, 1957, 
p.80). Especially, under the context of the Cold War, those studies became empirical studies 
of political decision-making closely related to studies on ideologies and economic power. 
 Early writings on voting behavior chiefly focused on class voting. Many studies set up 
a simple hypothesis that is individuals tend to vote in favor of their class, so the rich votes for 
conservative candidates and the poor for liberal or radical candidates (Brady, 1943; Hunter, 
1953; Mills, 1956). In particular, these studies emphasized the behavior of elite group in 
society composed of business executives and high-level government officials, and concluded 
that the elite group had been completely acting on collectivism by supporting conservative 
parties regardless of the qualities of policies.  
 While the simple dichotomy on class voting kept being used even by recent political 
sociologists, some scholars didn’t agree to the symptom of class voting. Comparing political 
behaviors in the several Western countries such as the United States, Germany, Sweden, 
Finland, France, Britain, etc., Bendix and Lipset confirmed a wide range of variance that is in 
each country, political behavior in different classes appeared in various ways (Bendix and 
Lipset, 1957, p.90). They recognized that in a society individuals are required to show 
political orientation in accordance with their social status. Since one individual can usually 
have several social status at the same time in terms of her or his occupation, ethnicity, 
affiliation, etc., the political behavior can appear in various ways (Bendix and Lipset, 1957, 
p.84). However, the study seems to too much rely on specific cases, so neglect to watch a 
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macro-trend in which, a myriad of unique individuals notwithstanding, there might be a 
collective behavior in any form. 
 Becoming an extension of the studies on voting behavior, the class voting has been 
studied by many scholars with several different academic disciplines. One of the attempts to 
dig up the origin of class voting was carried out by Lipset and Rokkan in 1967. In their most 
famous book, Cleavage Structure, Party System, and Voter Alignments, they provided a new 
milestone to political sociologists by exploring the so-called “cleavage structure” (Lipset and 
Rokkan, 1967). They tried to explain the origin of social cleavage and resulting party system 
by comparing those in the several Western Europian countries and even Mexico and Japan, 
and found the National Revolution and the Industrial Revolution in almost every country had 
promoted and developed the cleavage structure (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, pp.13-14). 
Especially, they drew and analyzed constellations of conflict lines among polities and found 
four distinct types of cleavages: two resulted from the National Revolution and the other two 
from the Industrial Revolution. The former cleavages include the conflict between “the 
central nation-building culture and the increasing resistance of…distinct subject populations 
in the provinces,” and the conflict between the Nation-State and the churches, while the latter 
includes “the conflict between the landed interests and the rising class of industrial 
entrepreneurs,” and the conflict between workers and employers (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, 
p.14).  
 In this structure, one particular point worth noting is that the cleavages from the 
Industrial Revolution can be understood in the same vein with social mobility and it was not 
quite tackled by ThorsteinVeblen. He didn’t give much information on the individuals whose 
class has been upwardly moved in terms of increasing income or property. As this study will 
deal with in the later part of this paper, studying the social mobility, that is investigating how 
the nouveaux riches politically act and which side they take after being rich, can give a great 
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insight into the formation of political orientation. Bendix and Lipset provided two opposed 
possibilities based on historical evidence: the nouveaux riches can either be further radicals 
such as the eighteenth century French bourgeoisie or be further conservative like the late 
nineteenth century German bourgeoisie (Bendix and Lipset, 1957, p.85). This symptom can 
be somehow explained by the concept of “double movement” coined by Karl Polanyi 
(Polanyi, 1944). Adding to his own definition of double movement in which he was chiefly 
concerned about the market separated from society, it can be interpreted in a broad sense that 
when there’s one main direction of a movement, a counter-movement always occurs under 
the name of social protection in order to intervene in an event. Polanyi inquired closely from 
the industrial revolution in England in the late 18th century to the World War II, and found 
the counter-movement used to be supported by individuals who were immediately affected by 
the deleterious event—in his time, usually the working class and the landed gentry gave a 
huge support to the counter-movement against the newly emerging trading classes (Polanyi, 
1944, p.138). 
 As Polanyi as well as Veblen found, it has been easily observed that the lowest class of 
a society teams up with the highest class of the society against a social transformation led by 
newly emerging middle class even when the change would bring a better life for the poor. 
Veblen attributed this ally relationship to the characteristic of the wealthier that is in a 
community it is more likely for the rich to have reputable position and acquire “a certain 
honorific or decorative value” than any other classes (Veblen, 1899; p.156). Therefore there 
has been often a social atmosphere created following the wealthier class with large and 
unconditional respect. This phenomenon is also well revealed in the Indian caste system. 
Through the process of “Sanscritizaiton”, the Brahmanical customs and rites—which were 
usually prohibited for the other caste to follow—were spread out not only to the castes 
immediately below Brahman, but even to the lowest caste (Srinivas, 1956; p.481). It was 
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possible due to the characteristic of Hindu society which was a strong hierarchical society 
and composed of a number of small groups. In order to bask in privileges of higher caste, 
each small group pretends to be a higher caste, so they imitated the rites and lifestyle of 
higher castes and finally the Brahmanical customs were found everywhere in society 
(Srinivas, 1956; p.481-483). 
 So far this study went through the formation pattern of political orientation by 
exploring famous literatures of prominent scholars, but, unfortunately, these writings cannot 
provide more substantive evidence due to the lack of data. As mentioned earlier, this study 
traced the already-revealed social phenomenon with a practical dataset. From now on this 
study will go through the literatures having tried to find the same pattern in Korean society, 
and then delve deeper into the substance of it.  
 
2.3 LR: Political Behavior in Korea 
 As observed in the first part of the introduction in this paper, the aforementioned 
general approach to the formation of one’s political orientation can be applied in full to 
Korea’s case. In particular, Koreans are absolutely great objects for studying this topic—that 
is, to see how an individual forms and develops her or his own political inclination through 
the whole lifetime—in that the Korean War in 1951 to 1953 had laid Korea to waste and 
brought almost every household to the relatively equal starting position in terms of economic 
fundamentals. Under this context, the initial studies of one’s political behavior in Korea 
chiefly focused on whether or not the basic assumption, which the political sociologists this 
study has seen in the previous part had once set up, was correct. In other words the initial 
studies in Korea have argued over the existence of class voting. While some scholars 
indicated that, due to the war, the political force of socialism wasn’t able to entrench in 
Korean society, so the pattern of class voting has hardly appeared in Korea’s political history 
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(Choi, 1996; Sonn, 1995; Baek, 2003), some asserted that class consciousness, so class voting, 
seems to exists depending on maturity of civil society in Korea (Lee et al., 2013). Of course, 
these studies in common owe setting up their hypothesis to the election data, and it has some 
severe limits in that the election data cannot catch a whole picture of one’s political behavior, 
but a snapshot of one specific moment. 
 On the extension of the studies on class voting, researches to find the voting pattern in 
Korea—the older, less-educated and less-incomer are inclinable to support a conservative 
candidate—have been also actively conducted by many scholars. The voting pattern have 
been observed since 1988 when a direct presidential election system was first promoted in 
Korea, and it has been a symbol of generation gap with the last presidential election as the 
culmination, and now it became a fertile spawning ground for social conflict between the 
older and younger generation. Scholars have tried to explain this social symptom in terms of 
age and cohort effects, and afforded plenty of evidence that demographic factors—such as 
age, gender, income, region, education level, the number of children etc.—are important 
determinants of voting behavior (Shin, 2001; Kang, 2003; Lee, 2008; Park, 2010; Lee et al., 
2013; Noh et al., 2013). Shin(2001) once studied the effects of age and sex composition of 
voters on election outcomes and effects of population distribution and redistribution on 
Korean political development. Lee et al.(2009) studied the class consciousness in Korea and 
how it has affected one’s political orientations and attitudes. Despite tons of studies including 
these papers introduced here that found many factors affecting one’s voting behavior or the 
results of elections, there are few studies that deal with more radical causality linking 
formation of political orientation to behavior.  
 Owing to its implicit political characteristics in Korea, studies on voting behavior 
necessarily and spontaneously dealt with generational conflict. Park(2010) observed that the 
average age of members of National Assembly of Korea has decreased and drew a conclusion 
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that the conflict among generations had resulted from the transfer timing of political power. 
In particular, he asserted that the generational conflict went into a latent period since 2007 
when the conflicts pattern no longer appeared in the same year presidential election and the 
general election in 2008. Yoon(2009) also diagnosed that the politics relying on generation 
was replaced by social movements. However, these superficial approaches to the symptom 
cannot explain the very guts of the matters and exposed themselves to the fallacy of hasty 
generalization. In reality the generation cleavage once again became the essential factor of 
the presidential election in 2012, it proved that exploring political behavior simply relying on 
election results can mislead into biased results. 
 
2.4 LR: Other Factors Affecting Political Orientation  
2.4.1 Psychological Approaches 
 In addition to the sociological and political approach to individual’s political orientation, 
psychological researches have added further depth and breadth to a large extent to the studies 
on political behavior. Using the Big Five traits as a measure of personality which indicates 
openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism, Gosling and his 
colleagues found that openness and conscientiousness are the strongly related traits to one’s 
political orientation (Gosling et al., 2003). They stated that there was a positive correlation 
between openness and liberalism while the same relation was found between conservatism 
and conscientiousness. In the Big Five personality traits, openness reflects individual’s 
preference for “novelty and sensation seeking”, and conscientiousness refers to “dutifulness 
and self-control” (Dunkel and Decker, 2012). 
 In terms of the child attachment security, the parent-child relationship is also an 
important factor affecting the formation of one’s political attitude (Lakoff, 2002). In Lakoff’s 
model,  children grown up under “strict father” home environment, or insecure attachment, 
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tend to be more conservative, while children from “nurturing mother” home environment, or 
secure attachment, are more likely to be liberal. Moreover, the degree to which people accept 
their parent’s political orientation is highly related to their emotional quality of adolescents’ 
relationship with their parents (Dunkel and Decker, 2012). In other words, having a good 
rapport with parents during the adolescent period helps people to adopt parents’ political 
orientation without reserve. Emotion has been also a key indicator showing one’s political 
orientation. In particular, disgust sensitivity such as fear and loathing of homosexuality has a 
positive relationship with conservatism (Invar et al., 2009). Regarding issues of purity, Inbar 
et al. made a research on American individuals after controlling for religious affiliation, and 
found that—not surprisingly—more conservative individual displayed a propensity of 
shunning homosexuality. 
 As observed above, the most important factors of the psychological approaches are the 
timing and method: when individual’s identity development takes place and in which manner 
it is revealed. In his study, Berzonsky assessed individual differences in identity development 
using the identity style model (Berzonsky, 1989). According to him, identity processing style 
can be split into three different styles: informational, normative, and diffuse-avoidant. Unlike 
the informational style with which individuals define themselves by their values and goals, 
the individuals who have the normative identity style see themselves through their family, 
religion, and ethnicity (Berzonsky, 2004); thus they tend to adopt their life goals or standards 
that are borrowed from others, and this normative identity style is highly associated with 
conservative attitudes. 
 
2.4.2 Genetical Approaches 
 Beyond the psychological approaches, a set of scholars has focused on genetics which, 
they argue, plays at least some role in shaping one’s political orientation. This approach is 
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associated with the Big Five approach explained above in that one’s personality represented 
by the Big Five is genetically inheritable to a large extent (Riemann et al., 1997; McCrae et 
al., 1998; Kandler et al., 2010). 
 According to Jang et al., the contribution of the genetic traits to the five dimensions of 
Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness was roughly 
41%, 53%, 61%, 41%, and 44% respectively (Jang et al., 1996). It provides a large part of the 
individual differences compared to the environmental explanation. Riemann and colleagues 
also conducted behavior-genetic research on personality by twin study of both monozygotic 
and dizygotic twin pairs and reconfirmed earlier findings that personality represented by the 
Big Five was substantially influenced by genetic traits (Riemann et al., 1997).  
 
3. Methodology and Discussion over Self-positioning 
 In order to approach to the primitive factors deciding one’s political inclination from 
more fundamental perspective, this study borrowed the data from the World Values Survey 
(WVS) that is the largest cross-national dataset exploring people’s values, beliefs, and public 
opinions, and has been used in a number of academic articles of social science. It has been 
conducted since 1981 in almost 100 countries including South Korea. Although its validity 
has been called into question by some scholars, and been checked with various 
methodologies (King et al, 2004; Johnson and Mislin, 2011; Donnelly and Pol-Eleches, 2012). 
Most of results have proved its validity and reliability in spite of some minor critics on 
several questions. Furthermore, since those critics chiefly focused on its cross-national 
validity or compatibility rather than that of within-country, it won’t be a matter for this study 
using survey results obtained only in Korea. 
 The survey questionnaire is comprised of over 1,000 questions among which this study 
focused on 5 key questions related to individual’s attitudes towards politics and social issues 
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and some of basic information such as age, gender, religion, the number of children, etc. Out 
of six times surveys carried out in Korea—in 1982, 1990, 1996, 2001, 2005, and 2010—this 
study took five of them except for the 1982 survey, considering data availability; thus the 
total number of sample amounts to 6,100 Koreans aged from 17 to 91, and the range of their 
birth year is from 1900 to 1991.  
 The methodology used in this study is twofold: first, self-positioning check using 
logistic regression and pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models to set up a 
definition of conservatism and liberalism and drawing implication of self-positioning, and 
second, least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimators with applying the WVS data to 
Veblen’s thoughts to find what makes individuals remain conservative. On the basis of these 
two stages, this study finally drew conclusions by combining them. The overall flow of the 
two stages is in Figure 2, followed by the details of each stage. 
 
Figure 2: Overall Flow of the Stage 1 and 2 
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3.1 First Stage: Validity of Self-positioning [Model (1) to (7)] 
 Once Conover and Feldman raised skeptical eyebrows on the traditional mass belief 
systems in which one individual can be simply put on a single ideological scale bar (Conover 
and Feldman, 1983). Using a schematic model, they showed that individuals form their 
political orientation in diverse and rich ways (Conover and Feldman, 1983, p.121). 
Furthermore, according to them, there is no clear logical links between one’s political 
orientation and their ideological self-positioning (Conover and Feldman, 1981).  
 Considering the self-positioning in question, in this study a self-positioning check was 
designed so as to understand how individuals connected their own political values to the 
self-positioning. In other words, through the self-positioning check, it was possible to 
confirm which political value affected one’s decision to locate themselves on the coordinate 
of political orientation, and ultimately check if the self-positioning is reasonable. 
 The dictionary definition of conservatism is “belief in the value of established and 
traditional practices in politics and society” and “dislike of change or new ideas in a 
particular area,”1 while the definition of liberalism is “belief in the value of social and 
political change in order to achieve progress.”2 Along with these dictionary definitions, the 
self-positioning check was designed in which five questions from the WVS questionnaire 
were picked up and fitted on the self-positioning on political scale using logistic and pooled 
OLS models. The five key questions are: 
 
- E035. Income equality: “Incomes should be made more equal.” vs. “We need larger 
income differences as incentives.” 
- E037. Government responsibility: “People should take more responsibility to provide 
for themselves.” vs. “The government should take more responsibility to ensure that 
everyone is provided for.”  
                                                          
1 Merriam-Webster, accessed on August 2, 2016, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/conservatism. 
2 Merriam-Webster, accessed on August 2, 2016, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/liberalism 
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- E041. Wealth accumulation: “People can only get rich at the expense of others.” vs. 
“Wealth can grow so there ́s enough for everyone.” 
- E047. Changes: “I worry about difficulties changes may cause.” vs. “I welcome 
possibilities that something new is beginning.” 
- E032. Freedom or equality: “Freedom above equality.” vs. “Equality above 
Freedom.” 
 
All questions but “E032” are on a scale of 1 to 10 using a Likert-type scale, and all of 
them are readjusted in order for being closer to 10 to indicate more conservative ideas and for 
being closer to 1 more liberal. In spite of many ongoing discussions on the Likert scale with 
its validity as interval variables, this study basically treated all explanatory Likert-type 
variables as interval data. Also in the model (1), the self-positioning indicator which is a 
dependent variable was transformed to a categorical type to be fitted in the logit model: 0 for 
the liberal who answered 1, 2, 3, or 4; and 1 for the conservative who actually answered 7, 8, 
9, or 10 on the 1 to 10 scale of political orientation. To make a clear demarcation, 
respondents who answered 5 or 6 were removed in the first stage. 
 
3.2 Second Stage: Application of Veblen’s Ideas to a Real World [Model (8) to (13)] 
On the basis of the results of self-positioning check in the first stage, this study in 
earnest explored how an individual forms her or his political orientation. Tracking Veblen’s 
ideas—that is, all are instinctively conservative and whether staying as conservative or 
becoming the liberal depends on one’s voluntary or mandatory choice of adaptation to a new 
living environment which has survived through the natural selection process of society—this 
study brought basic information of the WVS respondents into the model, such as birth year, 
gender, income, education level, religion, the number of children, etc. Especially, to identify 
the symptom that individuals—who are older, less educated, and have less income—tend to 
have conservative-tinted characteristics, this study included three key variables: age, 
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education level, and income. Furthermore, by inserting a quadratic term of income into the 
model, this study tried to find the increasing marginal conservativeness along with income 
being raised. 
In order to panelize the cross-sectional data collected in five different years, this study 
categorized the whole sample into six cohort groups by their birth year. For the criteria for 
cohort classification, this study basically used what Park once set up in his essay (Park, 2009), 
and somehow revised it in accordance with the purpose of this study. Considering historical 
events and the characteristics of generations, the cohort classification used in this study is as 
follows.  
- Korean War Generation: born before 1940 
- Post-Cold War Generation: born in 1941-1950 
- Baby Boom Generation: born in 1951-1960 
- 386 Generation:  born in 1961-1970 
- IMF Generation:  born in 1971-1980 
- 88k-won Generation:  born in 1981-1991 
 
4. Results 
 In order to assess aforementioned invalidity of self-positioning of political orientation, 
both logistic and pooled ordinary least squares models were performed. Unlike what Conover 
and Feldman were concerned about, the self-positioning indicator showed strong 
relationships with the fundamental political values of individuals in both model (1) and (2) 
(see Table 1).  
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 According to the result, the conservative can be defined as follows: a person who thinks 
that larger income difference is needed as incentives; who less prefers government 
intervention into her or his own life; who thinks there’s enough wealth which can be 
available for everyone; who are concerned for any difficulties changes bring about; and 
thinks freedom is over equality. The liberals have, of course, exactly contrary political values. 
 Based on this definition, this study investigated that what factors affected each of the 
key political values, and if there is a cohort effect. As a result, there was no factor among the 
individuals’ basic information which consistently have an influence on the political values, 
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but except for “Income equality” and “Freedom or equality”, there appeared the cohort effect 
significantly operating (see table 2). In particular, regarding the “Government responsibility” 
(model 4), all explanatory variables but the gender dummy showed statistically significant 
influence. The regression is: 
 
Government reponsibility
= 5.27∗∗∗ + 0.06 𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒∗∗∗ − . 70 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒∗∗∗ + . 10 𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙∗∗∗
−  .02 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 − . 30 386𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛∗∗∗ − 1.77 880𝑘𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛∗∗∗
− . 74 𝐵𝑎𝑏𝑦𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛∗∗∗ − . 76 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛∗∗∗
−  1.87 𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛∗∗∗ 
 
 As expected, compared to the Korean War generation, all cohorts emphasized more 
responsibility of the government, and the IMF generation and 880k generation appeared to 
have the strongest liberal inclination in terms of the government responsibility. The result is 
plausible in that the two cohorts who were born in 1970 to 1991 have suffered from the 
severe structural problems such as the unemployment crisis. 
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In accordance with such findings above, this study identified that the self-positioning 
variable well indicates one’s political orientation reflecting fundamental political values. On 
the basis with this result, this study in earnest dived into the analysis on Veblen’s ideas using 
the logistic regression models focusing on its applicability to the real world. As a result, the 
thoughts of Veblen were backed up by the regression models (see Table 3). That is, since the 
pressure forcing individuals to relinquish conservativeness and readjust themselves to a new 
environment takes a form of economic squeeze, it is likely that persons, who have enough 
wealth to stand against the pressure, or who cannot afford to spend time thinking of politics 
due to hardships of life, so instead just follow the existing system, remain conservative. The 
negative estimates of income notwithstanding, the positive estimates of the quadratic term of 
income well describe this phenomenon, or the increasing marginal conservativeness. The 
cohort effect here also appeared clearly. Just like the results of model (4), the younger cohorts, 
the stronger liberal inclination observed. However, contrary to expectation, the education 
level doesn’t show a significant relationship with the political orientation. Furthermore, 
neither do the interaction terms between income and cohort. This result suggests that, within 
a cohort, the level of income doesn’t affect the political orientation much. 
Most significantly, as predicted, the cohort effect seems to have a strong influence on 
self-positioning. Compared to the Korean War generation who were born before 1940, all 
other cohorts showed more liberal inclination. The 386 generation used to blame the younger 
generation to be neither critical nor progressive towards political issues as much as they were, 
but according to the results, the 880,000won generation proved to be more liberal than the 
386 generation. Confronting the worst situation of job market, it seems plausible that the 
social atmosphere of era affects the younger generation’s political orientation. It reminds that 
the pressure of change takes a form of economic squeeze. Also this has a thread of 
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connection with what Mannheim once indicated; that is to say, political orientation of young 
adults heavily relies on the opportunity their society provided (Mannheim, 1952, p.297).  
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In Table 4, this study brought the WVS implementing years, the number of children, 
and religion into new models, (11), (12), and (13) in order to estimate various factors which 
might have affected the political orientation. As a result, it appeared that the political 
orientation significantly differs depending on the implementing year, and compared to that 
base year 1990, it seems that conservative inclination has been reduced to large 
extent—surprisingly more than 1 point. This may be explained by transforming social 
atmosphere of Korea in which well-developed social welfare system considered as much 
important as economic development along with the increasing human rights since 1990s. 
People in 1996 or later put more value on equality than freedom and expect extended roles of 
government for social welfare than in 1990. In other words, from Veblen’s perspective, the 
time gap of turning into liberal had been significantly reduced between 1990 and 1996. Since 
1996, however, the gap seems much the same. Regarding this constant trend further studies 
should be tackled.  
Also, as predicted, individuals who have more children showed more conservative 
inclination, and religious individuals, regardless of religion, have more conservative 
characteristics, especially believers in Buddhism [the constant in model (13)]. 
These results have some policy implication in that now the conservative can be 
clearly divided into two kinds: one is the willing and active conservative composed of 
wealthy individuals and the other is passive and reluctant conservative of the poor. Although 
the two extremes meet under the name of conservative, they are totally different in terms of 
motivation and willingness to be conservative. Of course, this study doesn’t claim that liberal 
is better than conservative, or vice versa. However, at least, it emphasizes that the passive and 
reluctant conservative group is not as sound as the active and willing conservative group, 
because being conservative resulting from ignorance and indifference to politics can damage 
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the backbone of democracy. Thus, this study suggests reducing the population of passive 
conservatives through narrowing income gap and providing easily-accessible information.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 Every individual is conservative when they become a member of a society and start a 
social life. This conservative inclination continues because individuals tend to act on their 
instinct just like the law of inertia. However, the environment around them rapidly changes, 
and new institutions or systems are needed along with the change. At this moment, 
individuals—who were once conservative—were divided into two groups in terms of their 
willingness to accept the change: one group remaining conservative and the other group 
giving up the conservativeness. Due to the hard effort striving against instinct, staying 
conservative is always an easy bet if she or he is able to overcome economic pressure; thus, 
only two groups of people, who have enough wealth to stand against the pressure of change 
and who are so destitute that cannot even afford to think of it, keep their conservativeness 
either willingly or passively. 
 This study—demonstrating that the abovementioned hypothesis from Veblen is quite 
well suited for the real world—tried to look at the behind scenes of individual forming her or 
his own political orientation. Unlike the previous literatures whose superficial approaches for 
exploring one’s political inclination cannot touch the very guts of the matters, this study has 
academic meanings at least in that it brought up the subject and linked the endogenous factors 
explained by the Veblen’s theory to the real world WVS dataset. 
 The results of the regression models in this study showed that the conservativeness 
decreased as the level of income increased; however, the extent to which the conservative 
orientation reduced became smaller. It meant that the upper crust and the bottom of a society 
showed more conservative inclination than other groups of people. It provides an insight into 
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explaining some of the voting patterns in Korea which the older and low-incomer support a 
conservative candidate. Although this study couldn’t directly clean up the cause of that the 
less-educated individuals tend to be more conservative, probably it is because the less 
educated earns less income. 
 By placing cohort dummies in the models, this study showed that the cohort effect 
clearly exists in the formation of political orientation. Put it another way, an individual is 
largely influenced by her or his own growth environment when the political orientation was 
established. Most of all, since the IMF generation and 880,000-won generation showed 
stronger liberal inclination, Veblen’s hypothesis—the groups of individuals who cannot 
overcome the economic burden become liberal—seems to be somehow proved. 
 Consequently, it can be stated that all individuals are conservatives heading towards 
liberals, like the proslaver in old days who now is called a racist not a conservative. Only 
differs the timing of readjustment to be liberal. Because it is impossible to remove the 
difference among individuals, there are always conservatives and the liberals co-existing, so 
does conflict between them. If the conflict cannot be completely eliminated, it might be the 
best political solution to reduce the frequency and extent of conflict. For this end, it can be a 
good approach for policy makers to focus on providing sufficient information on social issues 
with easy accessibility, and narrowing income disparity, so that the passive conservative is 
able to put themselves on the upward flow of social mobility. Ultimately, the gap between 
individuals’ timing to be liberal would be reduced, and the conflict also be possibly 
moderated. 
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